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The stars are in the right place if you're ever going to do this,
because all of the incumbents are not going to be affected
simply because of term limits.... So now's the time.'
I. INTRODUCTION

From its inception, it was clear that the 1997-98 Florida Constitution
Revision Commission would confront the subject of abolishing the Florida
Cabinet. Those predicting the forthcoming issues all cited the cabinet
system as a likely subject to be considered by the Commission.2 At the
Commission's organizational session, Governor Reubin Askew advised the
Commission not to shy away from taking on important issues such as the
Florida Cabinet.3 Governor Claude Kirk's admonition "to make the
Governor the Governor... [d]emand a leader to lead" rang true with many
commissioners.4
What seemed equally clear was that the likelihood of Floridians voting
to abolish their elected cabinet was remote.5 Therefore, in the end, the
cabinet system was not abolished. Balancing the importance for success at
the polls with the desire to increase governmental accountability, the
Commission instead constructed a measure aimed at strengthening the
office of governor and, to some degree, streamlining the executive branch.
The ballot measure reduced the number of elected executive officers;
however, it did not restrict matters from being placed in the hands of a
plural executive.
1. Two members want Cabinet cut down to size, TAMPA TRiB., Sept. 11, 1997, at
Florida/Metro-3 (quoting Fla. State Treasurer Bill Nelson).
2. See Steven J. Uhlfelder & Billy Buzzett, Constitution Revision Commission: A
RetrospectiveandProspectiveSketch, 71 FLA. B.J., Apr. 1997, at 24. The Collins Center for Public
Policy lists "Reforming the Cabinet system" first among the potential issues likely to be considered
by the Constitution Revision Commission. See Collins Center for Public Policy
Web Site, Some Potential Issues for 1998 (visited Nov. 7, 1999)
<http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/collins/Potential.html>; see also Stephen T. Maher, The Florida
Cabinet: Is It Time for Remodeling?, 18 NOVAL. REV. 1123, 1125 (1994).
3. See STATEOFFLA. CONST. REVISioNCOMM'NJ.OFTHECONST.REVISIONCOMM'N 199798, at 20-21 [hereinafter CRC JOURNAL].
4. Id. at 12.
5. See Richard K. Scher, The Governor and the Cabinet-ExecutivePolicy Making and
Policy Management, in THE FLORIDA PUBLIC POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: GROWTH AND
REFORM 73, 100 (Richard Chackerian, Ed., Fla. Center for Public Management 1994) ("[I]t seems
unlikely that future efforts to rid Florida of its Cabinet will prove fruitful. Floridians are used to it.
The Legislature, interest and clientele groups, local governments, and the bureaucracies like it. Six
of the Cabinet members like it .... Only the governor, joined perhaps by students of public
administration and others interested in a more streamlined governmental structure do not.").
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This Article reviews the current status of the Florida Cabinet, then
explains the history and evolution of the cabinet from the state's earliest
constitution through the constitutional amendments adopted in 1998 with
the view toward assisting those who will implement the constitution and
those who seek to understand the changes.
A. What Is the FloridaCabinet?
Today's cabinet6 consists of six independently-elected executive branch
officers: the secretary of state, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer,
commissioner of agriculture and commissioner of education.7 All but one
of these officers is assigned, by statute, as the sole officer charged with
administering a department.8 As the department head, the cabinet member
exercises direct supervision over the agency9 and does not answer to the
governor in the exercise of that power.
While the public generally believes that their governor is responsible
for overseeing the administration of the government,1 ° there are five
departments headed by cabinet members over which the governor has
virtually no authority." In addition, there are four departments headed
collegially by the governor and cabinet 2 and numerous boards and
commissions, of which the governor is but one member, which supervise
the administration of various executive duties. The Department of
Education is headed by the commissioner of education, but the state board
of education, comprised of the governor and cabinet, is the chief
policymaking body of public education in the state. 3 The elected
6. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (prior to the revisions that take effect in 2003).
7. Id.
8. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (authorizing the legislature to designate a cabinet officer,

among others, as a department head). The constitutional options for department heads include the
governor, lieutenant governor, the governor and cabinet, or an officer or board appointed by and
serving at the pleasure of the governor. Id.

9. Id.
10. This has been the case for many decades, when even greater dilution existed. See REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL JOINT ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY COMMITrEE OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE OF
NINETEEN-HUNDRED FORTY-THREE

18

(1945); see also FARRIS BRYANT ET AL, THE

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OFFLORMDA77 (1957) ('The popular mind ascribes greater power to
the Governor than he legally possesses."); Manning J.Dauer & William C. Havard, The Florida
Constitution of 1885-A Critique, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 43 (1955) (noting that the governor's
position "makes him accountable in the eyes of the public for the complete operation of the
executive branch").
11. These include the Department of State (Secretary of State), Department of Legal Affairs
(Attorney General), Department of Banking and Finance (Comptroller), Department of Insurance
(Treasurer), and Department ofAgricultureand ConsumerServices (CommissionerofAgriculture).
12. These consist of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Department of
Law Enforcement, Department of Revenue, and Department of Veterans Affairs.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 20.15(1) (1997).
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commissioner of education administers the day-to-day operations and
shares some of the executive power with the state board of education as a
member of the state board. 4
It is this collegial executive decision-making that makes the structure
of Florida's executive branch so unique. Unlike a traditional cabinet
consisting of advisors to a chief executive, Florida's cabinet officers sit as
equals to the governor in many respects. It is an executive branch, run in
significant part, by a board of directors, with the governor acting as
chairman of the board. 5
The beginning of what developed into this unique cabinet system was
marked at 1855, when the Florida Legislature established the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, an ex officio board
comprised of the governor and the other elected executive officers of the
executive branch.16 Today, there exists a multitude of ex officio boards and
commissions which are administered jointly by the governor and cabinet.
Currently, there are some fifteen agencies 7 over which the governor and
cabinet, or some combination of them, exercise direct and collegial
supervision. It is this ability to assign departments or other significant
programs to the governor along with the cabinet that so greatly impinges
on gubernatorial power.
B. What Are the Criticisms of the FloridaCabinetSystem?
Those who oppose Florida's cabinet system do so on the basis that it
lacks accountability and is not efficient. There are two distinct aspects to
their argument. First, by establishing multiple independently-elected
officers to exercise the executive power in certain areas, the governor's
role as chief executive is weakened. The public looks to the governor as
the responsible official, yet the governor is nearly powerless to act in areas
under the jurisdiction of one of the other executive officers. However, this
situation is not unique among the states. Forty-two other states elect
executive officers in addition to the governor and lieutenant governor.' 8

14. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; FLA. STAT. § 20.15 (1997); FLA.

STAT. § 229 (1997).
15. See Allen Morris, The CabinetTeam, FLA. BUS. & OPPORTUNITY, Oct. 1960, at 16.
16. See ALLEN MORRIS & JOAN P. MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1997-1998, at 667
(1997).
17. These agencies include the Fiscal Accounting and Information Board, State Board of
Administration, Division of Bond Finance, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Department of Law Enforcement, Department of Revenue,
State Board of Education, State Board of Career Education, Administration Commission, Florida
Land and WaterAdjudicatory Commission, Trustees oftheMarineFisheries Commission, Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, and Office of Greenways and Trails.
18. See 32 THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov., THE BOOK OFTHE STATES (1998-99 ed.)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/7

4

Kearney: The Florida Cabinet in the Age of Aquarias
FLORIDA CABINET

Second, the governor's authority is further weakened by the assignment
of governmental functions, collegially, to these executive officers.
Assigning duties to the governor and cabinet not only dilutes the executive
authority, but places the governor in the position of having to barter and
negotiate, or worse, of failing to put forth initiatives that are not likely to
have the support of the majority of the cabinet.' 9 Further, this dispersion of
authority limits governance in accordance with the ideals of the governor
and with campaign promises made.2" It has been called a device for
"spreading the heat."'"
It is confusing to the public that cabinet officers exercise many powers
far outside the jurisdiction their titles would suggest. Voters would rarely
consider the viewpoints of candidates for the office of state treasurer on
topics such as higher education.' Political commentaries have noted that
"[tihe people.., do not have the vaguest notion that they are voting for a
3
... [person] who would have an equal voice" on educational matters.
Yet, with the exception of the governor and cabinet sitting as the Clemency
Board and as the Administration Commission, the governor's power is no
greater than that of any of the six cabinet members.'
In his support of a strong governor, counterbalanced by a strong
legislature, Chesterfield Smith, Chairman of the 1966 Constitution
Revision Commission, argued that the cabinet is elected by special
interests-"the commissioner of agriculture by the agricultural interests;
the comptroller by the bankers; the treasurer by the insurance people and
the superintendent of public instruction by the teachers. As a result they
(the cabinet) speak for them (the special interests groups) and not the
people."25
It is also commonly noted that the sheer number of assignments given

19. See Dauer& Harvard, supranote 10, at 43-44 (detailing views stated by the Special Joint
Economy and Efficiency Committee of the 1943 Florida Legislature).
20. See Carlos Alfonso, CabinetReform Analysis, CONST. REVISION COMM'N NEWSL, Jan.
1998, at 3.
21. ALLEN MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1995-1996, at 6 (1995) (quoting Governor
Fuller Warren); ALLEN MORRIS &ANN WAt.DRON, YOUR FLORIDA GOVERNMENT: 500 QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS 15-16 (1965).
22. See CENTER FOR PRACTICALPO.ITICS, SHOULD FLORIDA REVISETHE CABINETSYSTEM?
7 (1966) (interviewing Secy. of State Tom Adams and State Rep. Richard Pettigrew).
23. Id.
24. The Clemency Board cannot grant clemency without the matter being moved forward by
the governor. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a) (stating that "the governor may,... with the approval
of three members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute
punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses"). Likewise, unless otherwise provided by
statute, "affirmative action by the [administration] commission shall require the approval of the
Governor and at least three other members of the commission." See FLA. STAT. § 14.202 (1998).
25. Vance Johnston, Constitution Reviser Raps Elected Cabinet, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 18,
1967, at 1.
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the governor and cabinet prevent the members from achieving solid
grounding in all of their duties.26 The public understandably is unsure of
who to credit for good policies and who to hold accountable for bad ones.27
Even supporters of the cabinet system admit the cabinet is so bogged down
with a myriad of functions that cabinet members have insufficient time to
devote to their constitutional roles.28
Finally, it has been argued that
[i]n our republican form of government, the traditional
concept of checks and balances is designed to impose limits
on the chief executive from without.., from the legislative
and judicial arms, not from within the executive branch. To
compound the governor's authority with needless checks and
balances from within is to deprive the governor of some
prerogatives.29
C. What Are the Benefits of the Cabinet?
In the past, cabinet members have been among the most vocal
supporters of the cabinet system. Secretary of State Tom Adams was a
tireless supporter of the cabinet. Among the attributes he found in this
system was its ability to provide a public forum in executive decisionmaking.30 Secretary Adams applauded the "consistency of purpose" and
"genuine stability" that the cabinet added in seeing the state through many
changes in administration, as well as the assistance it gave to new
governors who could partake in this source of experience.31
Elected cabinet members, Adams found, are most responsive to the
public, whereas appointed administrators owe their allegiance to the person
who appointed them. 32 The sound decision-making attributed to the cabinet
is the result of the "business-like" structure that the cabinet system
represents.33 Comptroller Bud Dickinson found that this "board of
directors" style of administration has led to a more stable and conservative

26. See Dauer & Harvard, supra note 10, at 5.
27. WJXT EditorialComment (WJXT-Jacksonville television broadcast, May 19, 1964).
28. Malcolm B. Johnson, PrefersStrongerCabinetSystem, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Dec.

6, 1964, at 6A.
29. See WJXT, supra note 27.
30. See WJXT EditorialComment (WJXT-Jacksonville television broadcast, June 2, 1964)
(broadcasting Tom Adams' response to WJXT May 19 Editorial).
31. Tom Adams, Florida'sCabinet System of Executive Leadership Is Unique, IN THE
CAPITOL (official publication of the Fla. Secy. of St.), Nov. 1963, at 1.
32. Tom Adams, The Florida Cabinet: Democracy Exemplified, IN THE CAPITOL (official
publication of the Fla. Secy. of St.), Apr. 1966, at 1.
33. Fred 0. Dickinson, Jr., The FloridaCabinet,43 FLA. B. J., 337, 378 (1969).
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state government.34
Malcolm Johnson, long time editor and political commentator for the
Tallahassee Democrat, explained his support of Florida's cabinet system
by explaining that "[w]e are spared really bad administration of
government by our unique system of electing six independent Cabinet
officers.... - Mr. Johnson claimed that the cabinet system assured a
check on the governor's exercise of power, and that the longer terms of
cabinet officers provided continuity in the state's governance.36 Mr.
Johnson later summed up the belief of many by stating quite simply, that
"the cabinet works well."37 And, it is generally agreed that the caliber of
elective cabinet officers in Florida has generally been quite high.38
D. How Was the Issue Addressed?
The 1998 constitutional revisions to Article IV continue the modem
trend toward enhancing the executive powers of the state's governor.
The
39
ballot language of Revision 8 describes the changes it makes:
Merges cabinet offices of treasurer and comptroller into one
chief financial officer; reduces cabinet membership to chief
financial officer, attorney general, agriculture commissioner;
secretary of state and education commissioner eliminated
from elected cabinet; secretary of state duties defined by law;
changes composition of state board of education from
governor and cabinet to board appointed by governor; board
appoints education commissioner; defines state board of
administration, trustees of internal improvement trust fund,
land acquisition trust fund.'
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the changes made by Revision 8
"fixed" the criticisms that are made of the system. The ballot proposal fell
short of abolishing the cabinet system. In fact, the revisions newly graft
4

34. See id.
35. Malcolm B. Johnson,A PoliticalTruth CouldGo Wrong, TALAHASSEEDEMOCRAT, Apr.

3, 1960, at 4.
36. See id.

37. Johnson, supra note 28, at 6A.
38. See Dauer & Harvard, supra note 10, at 45.
39. Bear in mind that a statutory limit of 75 words for the ballot summary exists. See FLA.
STAT. § 101.161(1) (1990). Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation required that the
chief purpose of the amendment be stated in clear and unambiguous language. See Askew v.
Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982). This presented a real challenge to the Commission and
resulted in a summary clearly lacking in polish and good grammar.
40. Revision 8-Restructuring the State Cabinet, FLA. GENERALELECTIONBALLOr (Nov. 3,

1998).
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into the constitution several areas that are required to be supervised by the
governor and cabinete4 ' and does not prevent the legislature from
establishing others. Three executive officers other than the governor will
continue to be elected statewide. Supporters expect the changes to improve
government accountability and efficiency. For practical purposes, the
amendment should yield fewer agencies being headed by the governor and
cabinet and by cabinet officers.
II. HISTORY
The role of the Florida Cabinet has evolved over time. While the
system remains a source of controversy and generally a source of some
amount of irritation to governors,42 it is today somewhat less intrusive into
gubernatorial power than it once was, and will be even less so beginning
in 2003.
At the birth of the nation, the states created their executive branches as
the weakest of the three quite unequal branches of government. The first
states revealed their distaste for colonial governors of the crown43 in state
constitutions that provided for such a weak executive branch that, in some
cases, the governor was a mere agent of the legislature.'
A. 1838 Constitution
The first of Florida's six constitutions was written in 1838 and adopted
in the election of May 1839 as the document prepared for submission to
the United States Congress in the move toward statehood.45 The 1838
Constitution provided for a governor who was allowed one four-year
term.4 6 The executive branch was rounded out by a secretary of state, state
treasurer, and comptroller of public accounts-all elected by joint vote of
both houses of the general assembly.' Upon gaining statehood in 1845,
this document served as the state's constitution until Florida seceded from
the United States in 1861.

41. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, at 221.
42. Virtually every governor since WWI has called for executive reorganization. See Daisy
Parker & Albert L. Sturm, The Executive Branch in the Florida Constitution 14 (1966) (paper

prepared for the 1965 Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Institute of Governmental
Research, The Florida State University); see also An Introductionto the FloridaCabinetSystem,
The Florida Department of State Website (visited May 9, 1999)
<http://www.dos.state.fl.us/cabinetsystem.html>.
43. See Parker & Sturm, supra note 42, at 1.
44. See LARRY SABATO, GOODBYETO GOOD-TIMECHARLIE: THE AMERICANGOVERNORSHIP
TRANSIVRMED 3 (2d ed. 1983).
45. See FLA. CENENNIAL COMM'N, FLORIDA BECOMES A STATE 69 (1945).
46. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 2.
47. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, §§ 14,23.
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B. 1861 Constitution
A constitutional convention was called for by the electors in 1860 for
the purpose of taking into consideration the position of this state in the
Federal Union. An Ordinance of Secession was adopted by the convention
on January 10, 1861.4
In April 1861 the new constitution was adopted. It was, in most
respects, similar to the 1838 Constitution, except that "Confederate States"
was substituted for "United States. 49 Changes were also made to the
article relating to the executive branch. Effective in 1865, the governor
would be elected for a two-year term, but there was no prohibition on
successive terms. 0 The other executive officers, still elected by joint vote
of both legislative houses, would likewise serve two-year terms. 51Since the
confederacy fell before the effective date of these executive branch
changes, the two-year terms and the absence of a gubernatorial term limit
were never implemented. 2
C. 1865 Constitution
At the close of the Civil War, Florida's Provisional Governor, William
Marvin, at the direction of President Andrew Johnson, called an election
to name delegates to a constitutional convention.53 This 1865 Constitution
set the governor's term at four years and contained no limitations on reelection.54 The remaining executive officers were to be chosen by popular
election for the first time.55
The 1865 Constitution was effective for a very short time, as Congress
rejected President Johnson's plan for reuniting the states.56 Congress
48. See FLA. CONST. of 1861, ordinance of secession.
49. Id.
50. See FLA. CoNsT. of 1861, art. I,§ 2.
51. See MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 16, at 667.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 668.
54. See FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. 11, § 2.
55. See FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. III, §§ 15, 23.
56. There appears to be conflicting views as to whether this constitution took effect at all.
"The Constitution never became operative.... as Congress rejected President Johnson's plan for
returning.., the states of the Confederacy to their pre-war status." MORRIS &MORRIS, supra note
16, at 668. To the contrary, Talbot D'Alemberte states the 1865 Constitution "was in effect for only
slightly more than two years...." TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION, A
REFERENCE GuIDE-6 (G. Alan Tarr, series ed., Greenwood Press 1991).
The latter view is supported by the facts that the constitution was adopted on November 7,
1865, and article 17, section 5 of the document called for ageneral election to be held on November
29, 1865. The Reconstruction Acts were not adopted until 1867-1869. Reconstruction Acts: Mar.
2, 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428; Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14;
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adopted the Reconstruction Act of 1867,57 placing southern states,
including Florida, under martial law.
D. 1868 Constitution
By military order, delegates were elected in November 1867 to write a
new constitution for the state; however, after much turmoil, factionalism,
and antagonisms among the group, Florida's commanding general selected
the drafters from among the delegates.5" During this period of
Reconstruction, Northern "carpetbaggers" were able to martial great
political strength, supported in large part by black voters and by the
disenfranchisement of many white Southerners.
The Constitution of 1868 (often called the Reconstruction, or
"Carpetbag" constitution), was the first to speak of a cabinet. This
constitution provided for a "highly integrated administrative organization
under the governor." 9 A cabinet composed of eight administrative officers
to "assist" the governor was established.60 These early cabinet officers were
appointed by the governor, subject to Senate confirmation. 61 This
constitution concentrated enormous power in the governor.62
E. 1885 Constitution
The end of Reconstruction came in 1876 when home rule was returned
to the southern states.63 Florida convened yet another convention to tailor
a state constitution. The Constitution of 1885 was a clear response to the
carpetbag constitution and its disarming level of executive power64 which,
to add to the insult of military control, had all too often been exercised in
an incompetent and corrupt manner.6' The reaction to the Reconstruction

Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41; Dec. 22, 1869, ch. 3. 16 Stat. 59.
57. See 15 Stat. 25 (1868).
58. See MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 16, at 668.
59. WILSON K. DOYLE ET AL, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF FLORIDA 85

(1954).
60. See FLA- CONsT. of 1868, art. V, § 17. (instituting the offices of Secretary of State,
Attorney-General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Surveyor-General, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Adjutant-General and Commissioner of Immigration). In 1871, the Surveyor-General and
Commissioner of Immigration were consolidated into a Commissioner of Lands and Immigration.
Fla. Laws, ch. 1838 (1871-1872).
61. See id.
62. For example, the governor could appoint a multitude of county officers. See FLA. CONST.
of 1868, art. V, § 19.
63. See D'AEMBERTE, supra note 56, at 7.
64. See DAVID R. COLBURN &RICHARD K. SCHER, FLORIDA'S GUBERNATORIALPOLrrICS IN
THE TWEMEH CENTURY 102 (1980).
65. D'Alemberte states, "Given the resentment stemming from defeat in the Civil War and
the postwar military occupation, there is little chance that the carpetbagger government would have

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/7

10

Kearney: The Florida Cabinet in the Age of Aquarias
FLORIDA CABINET

government was to provide for a very weak governor and dilute the
executive power across multiple independent executive officers. The
governor was not eligible for re-election after one four-year term.66 The
administrative officers were subject to popular election67 and were not
restrained by a term limit. It was this omission of a limit on re-election of
cabinet members that made later changes very difficult, as cabinet
members developed strong constituencies over lengthy terms while
governors came and went every four years.
This 1885 Constitution provided that, in addition to their specific
duties, cabinet members could be made responsible to perform further
duties as prescribed by law.68 In the most exacting terms, the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution to allow administration by
various boards and commissions which included the executive branch
officers.69 In 1920, the court upheld the validity of rules promulgated by
the state livestock sanitary board, which was comprised of the
commissioner of agriculture, superintendent of public instruction, state
treasurer and two members appointed by the governor.70 In that case, the
court, in no uncertain terms, held that the legislature had the power to
assign additional duties to constitutional officers, and these additional
duties may include serving on boards and commissions.71
The staying power of the 1885 Constitution should not be considered
a testament to an unchanging Florida citizenry. Throughout its tenure, the
1885 Constitution was amended 151 times73 and in later years resembled
a patchwork quilt of Florida's organic law.74 Efforts to modernize the state

been popular had it been competent and honest. It was neither." D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 56, at

8.
66. See FA. CONST. of 1885, art. IV, § 2.
67. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IV,§ 20.
68. Except such language is not included with respect to the Treasurer; however, the Attorney
General was to perform "such other legalduties" as provided bylaw. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IV,
§§ 21, 22, 23, 25, 26.
69. See Whitaker v. Parsons, 86 So. 247, 251-52 (Fla.1920).

70. Seeid. at251.
71. See id.
72. The 1885 Constitution served the state for eighty-three years.
73. SeeMORRIS &MORRIS, supra note 16, at664. A total of 214amendments wereproposed.

Id.
74. As early as 1955, after the Constitution had been amended only 94 times, the legislature
made a finding that amendments

have been adopted at various times through the years without logical relationship
to subject matter until at the present time this, our most important guarantee of
rights and liberties, has become a puzzle in many of its concepts... many sections
in the constitution are contradictory in language and vague to such an extent in
meaning that there exists a state of confusion resulting in hardships, delays and
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constitution were met with resistence from a poorly apportioned legislature
with much vested in the status quo.75
In1945, a specially-created joint committee of the legislature reported
that there had been, for some thirty years, interest in reorganizing the
executive branch "due to the cumbersome, extensive and poorly organized
structures which had grown up."76 All but five states
in the Union had
77
reorganized or were in the process of reorganizing.
In 1955, Governor Collins called for a Florida Constitution Advisory
Commission, which was established by the legislature.78 While the key
issue of the Commission was apportionment of the legislature,79 executive
branch reform was also a matter within its purview.8 0 Governor Collins
caused a flurry of comment upon his address to the Commission when he
advised the members that they should not hesitate to review "our entire socalled Cabinet system."' l Governor Collins noted that much of the system
is obsolete, that the duties of cabinet members extend far beyond the
original constitutional concept, and that cabinet members are overburdened between administering their assigned departments as well as
attending
to the functions of all of the ex-officio boards on which they
82
serve.

The period from the 1950's through the 1980s was one of explosive
change in the states' treatment of executive power.83 Unresponsive,
indecisive, and ineffective state governments brought to light that "the
neglect of problems caused by a fragmented and diffused state
government
8' 4
was a greater evil than the potential for executive abuse.

injustices....
S.Con. Res. 555, 1955 Sess. (Fla. 1955).
75. "Redistribution of senate seats threatened... [Porkchoppers'] power over state revenues
and patronage, the weapons they used to build and maintain their political strength." TOM WAGY,
LEROY COLLINS OP FLORIDA, SPOKESMAN OF THE NEW SOuTH 51 (1985). Porkchoppers were
legislators from rural, agricultural districts, which districts, because of population shifts, had an

inequitably greater amount of power based upon a one person, one vote concept. See id. at 51.
76. REP. SPEC. JOINT ECONOMY & EFFCIENCY COMM. OFFLA. LEGIS. OF 1943 (1945).
77. See id.
78. The resolution established a 37-member commission composed of the president of the
senate, speaker of the house of representatives, 8 house members, 8 senate members, and 5
members appointed by each of the governor, the chiefjustice of the supreme court and the Florida
Bar. See S. Con. Res. 555, 1955 Sess. (Fla. 1955).
79. See WAGY, supranote 75, at 104.
80. See id. at 49.
81. Governor Leroy Collins, Address before Constitution Advisory Commission, Floridian
Hotel, Tampa (Oct. 22, 1955) (located at Florida Archives, Series 776, Carton 6).
82. See id.
83. See SABATO, supra note 44, at 1.
84. Id.
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The 20th Century brought an era characterized by growth in executive
power.s Typically, governors had found they lacked the authority to
faithfully execute the laws 86 -Florida being an extreme example. 7
Legislative abuses led states to place limitations on their legislatures,
thereby benefitting the executive branch."8 Executive reforms made by
states during this period included reducing the number of executive
agencies, lengthening gubernatorial terms, and providing staff aids and
management controls." Florida's executive branch, meanwhile, was
characterized by an increasing number of executive agencies and the
extensive use of cabinet ex-officio boards and commissions.' °
Florida was, however, undergoing a period of great change, amplified
by unprecedented growth and a poorly apportioned legislature. Growing
urban areas were not proportionally represented, and their propensity to
favor progressive ideas was stilted until the federal courts required
reapportionment based on the one person-one vote principal. 91 Once
reapportioned, it was now possible to address the issue of modernizing the
Florida Constitution. A major issue in this effort was, of course, the
structure of the executive branch.
F. 1968 Constitution
In 1965, upon the recommendation of Governor Hayden Bums, the
newly-apportioned Florida Legislature created a constitution revision
commission and charged it with the duty to submit recommendations for
revisions to the state constitution.' In the findings prefatory to the law
which established the commission, the legislature expressed the need for
members of each branch of state government to make a careful study of the
constitution "for the purpose of eliminating obsolete, conflicting and
unnecessary provisions as well as for framing an orderly and properly
arranged constitution, based upon economic and social changes... ."" The
recommendations of the constitution revision commission were submitted
to the legislature prior to its 1967 legislative session. The legislature made

85. See Parker & Sturm, supra note 42, at 1.
86. See L.VAUGHAN HOWARD & JOHN H. FENTiN, STATE GOVERNMENTS INTHE SOUTH:
FUNCrIONSAND PROBLEMS 25 (1956).
87. See id. at 26 (stating that, in Florida, "obviously the governor is chief executive in name
only").
88. See id.
89. See Parker & Sturm, supra note 42, at 2.
90. See id.
91. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 209 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8

(1964).
92. See 1965 Fla. Laws ch. 65-561.

93. Id.
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only modest changes to the commission's recommendations regarding the
cabinet in Article IV, Section 4.94
The 1968 Constitution made many improvements in the operations of
the legislative branch95 and shortly thereafter the judicial article was
brought up-to-date.' This wholesale reform was not extended to the
executive branch, but nevertheless the 1968 Constitution made some
dramatic changes that strengthened the governor's role. The opportunity
for succession to a second term was introduced in 1968. 97 This made the
governor more than a lame duck for the entire tenure. Also introduced in
1968 was the requirement that the functions of government be allotted
among no more than twenty-five departments.98 In 1968, there were 166
agencies identified as making up the executive branch. 99 The resulting
1969 reorganization of the executive branch made some improvement with
regard to the earlier problems with duplication and dispersion in
administering the government.
On the other hand, the 1968 Constitution codified into our organic law
what had previously been the statutory-based practice of government by an
ex-officio board. Dr. Lance deHaven-Smith, a noted state constitution
scholar, has posited that the implementation of Article IV, Section 4 has
not been as it was intended."° The arguments in favor of the cabinet
system were to improve coordination and accountability and to reduce
fragmentation among the various entities of the executive branch.''
Instead, he notes, the governor and cabinet are assigned so many tasks that
decisions are routinely delegated to aides, adding to the bureaucracy,
impeding the desired public forum and accountability, and complicating
rather than simplifying decision-making. 0 2

94. See FLA. STAT. ANN. art. 4, § 4 (West 1995) (commentary by Talbot "Sandy"
D'Alemberte).
95. Of significant importance was the requirement for the appointment of an auditor to be
appointed by the legislature. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 2. A complete fiscal analysis by
its own staff is "the most effective possible device for holding an administrative accountable to its
policies." Dauer & Harvard, supra note 10, at 48. Other checks on executive power were
introduced, including a merit system for personnel, see FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 14, and
annual, as opposed to biannual legislative sessions which enabled the legislature to assume its
appropriate policy-making role. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 3(b).
96. A wholly revised article V was adopted in 1972. See S.J. Res. 52-D, Spec. Sess. (Fla.

1971).
97. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. IV, § 5(b).
98. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. IV, § 6.
99. See CENTER, supra note 22, at 2.
100. See LANCEDEHAVEN-SMITH, FOUNDATIONSOFREPRESENTATIVEDEMOCRAcY35 (The
Collins Center and The Florida Institute of Government ed., 1997).
101. See id. at 263.
102. See id. at 281-82.
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G. Proposalsby the 1978 ConstitutionRevision Commission
The issue of Florida's cabinet was one of major importance throughout
the tenure of the 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission. One of the
Commission's eight proposed revisions would have abolished the cabinet
system entirely.'0 3 Like all of the 1977-78 Constitution Revision
Commission proposals, Revision 4 was not adopted.1t 4 There are numerous
reasons given for the defeat of all of the Commission's proposals." °5
Certainly a contributing factor was that the first revision cycle came only
ten years after the wholesale rewrite of the state constitution in 1968. It
cannot be ignored, though, that cabinet members with long tenures (actual
or prospective) and loyal constituencies vigorously opposed Revision 4.
This is in stark contrast to the situation in 1998 where term limits had
rendered most sitting cabinet officials ineligible to succeed themselves
after the 1998 election." 0
As noted above, the unsuccessful 1978 proposal was a full abolishment
of the cabinet system. The only executive officers to run statewide would
have been the governor and lieutenant governor, running on a joint
ticket.'" The administrators of all executive agencies would have been
appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation.108 As to issues
involving the investment of trust funds and agency funds, state bonds, and
state lands, the legislature was directed to designate at least one other

103. See Const. Revision Comm'n, proposal 213, at D005 355-57 (Fla. 1978).
104. The vote was 540,979 for and 1,614,630 against. Tabulation of Official Results, Fla. Gen.
Election, Nov. 7, 1978 (on file with Florida Department of State, Division of Elections).
105. For example, Governor Chiles mentioned that "[tihere were just too many proposals."
CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, June 16, 1997, at 5. Commissioner and Senate President Toni
Jennings recommended that the 1997-1998 Commission propose each revision with "a single, easyto-understand subject instead of coupling things together" to avoid the criticisms made of the
revisions proposed by the previous commission which often coupled unrelated subjects. Id. at 6.
Professor Robert F. Williams suggested that 1978 was a time when "the current negativism about
government" was beginning. CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, June 17, 1997, at 18. Steve Uhlfelder
Executive Director of the 1978 Commission, stated that in 1978 competition grew between the
legislature and the commission. See id. at 19. Further, Mr. Uhlfelder believes the 1978 revisions
would have been fewer and better received had the commission required more than a majority vote
for ballot placement. See id. at 20.
106. See supra note I and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 103, proposals 213 & 214, at D005354-57.
108. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE FLORIDA CONST. 15
(1978) (proposing schedule with Regard to Abolition of Cabinet). This, to some degree, conflicted
with article IV, section 6 in the same revision, which provided that "[t]he administration of each
department... shall be placed by law under the direct supervision of the governor, the lieutenant
governor, or an officer or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor...." FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 6, rev. 4 (proposed 1978). That is, the latter provision would have allowed the
legislature to place a department under the supervision of the lieutenant governor, or directly under
the governor, thereby not allowing for gubernatorial discretion in appointing someone else.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

officer to act with the governor.0 9 Power'plant siting, dredge and fill
permitting, supervision over rules and order of water management districts,
and approving developments of regional impact were to have been
transferred to a board appointed by the governor.10 The governor was also
given the full clemency power."'
11.

1998 CHANGES AND THEIR HISTORY
A. Opening Session

It did not take long for the issue of cabinet reform to arise with the
1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission. At the Commission's opening
session, every former governor who spoke broached the subject. Similar
to each of the appointing authorities,'1 2 Governor Chiles expressed his
belief that the constitution may, at this time, require only a tune-up, not an
overhaul."' He did, however, highlight issues that he felt were important
for the commission to address such as to "tackle... the structure of the
Executive Branch of our government... and develop a better way for the
Governor and Cabinet to serve our people."' 4 Governor Kirk was far
stronger in his urging that the commission deal with the cabinet system:
You have a blessed opportunity to give the now and next
Florida the freedoms we all deserve and desire, but have
never gotten. No unaccountable Cabinet can lead to or even
toward any of the freedoms we pay for every day. Convince
yourselves, and then convince our old faint-hearted of the
state as well as the new and confused folks of Florida, to
make the Governor the Governor. Demand a leader to lead.
Give the next governors the responsibility and the appointed
control of the Department of Education and of the Office of
Attorney General.
The rest you can leave with the lobbyists,
5
if you must."1
Governor Askew acknowledged that he had supported the elected cabinet
system prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, because prior to

109. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § I(g)(1), rev. 4 (proposed 1978).
110. See FLA. CONST., SCHEDULE with Regard to Abolition of Cabinet, subsection (a)

(proposed 1978).
111. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8, rev. 4 (proposed 1978).
112. FLA. CONST. art. XI,&2 (1988) (governor, president of the senate, speaker of the house
of representatives, and chief justice of the supreme court).
113. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, June 16, 1997, at 5.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 12.
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1968 the Florida Legislature was a weaker body and it was therefore
necessary to diffuse executive power to maintain a balance among the
branches." 6 Now, he finds, both the legislative and judicial branches are
strong and the cabinet system prevents the proper balance among the three
branches."' Governor Askew urged the Commission to address this issue,
stating:
You do not have an Executive Branch of government that can
respond to the people on public policy as a Governor could
with a singular voice. One of the things we found in the
Legislature, with my predecessor, is that as much as we
disagreed, we were diffused and couldn't really get any public
forum. The Governor is still the one that has the forum and is
the only one that, in effect, can challenge the people. If you
really want to have a Governor lead, and not just respond to
what the polls say, frankly, you need to give that Governor the
authority of the office. And then I think you will find it better
than it is now." 8
B. PublicHearings
Prior to the filing or consideration of any proposals and during the
course of twelve public hearings held at the outset of the Commission's
tenure, the subject of the Florida Cabinet was addressed by many citizens.
It was the position of the League of Women Voters that the cabinet should
be appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation." 9 A key
reason for this position was the view that special interests were financing
the campaigns of "specialized" cabinet members. 20 The League further
favored a repeal of Section 2 of Article IX, which establishes the governor
and cabinet as the state board of education. Their recommendation was for
the governor to appoint a separate board of education so that education
might serve as the primary interest of the board members. 21- The
Chancellor of the State University System made much the same
recommendations at a later hearing."
Former Secretary of State Jessie McCrary supported abolishing the

116. See id.
117. Seeid.
118. CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, June 17, 1997, at 21.
119. See Mary Knight, Florida League of Women Voters, Presentation at Panama City Public
Hearing (July 22, 1997).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See Charles B. Reed, Chancellor, State University System, Presentation at Jacksonville
Public Hearing (July 29, 1997).
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cabinet because it is antiquated, mentioning that both the judicial and
legislative branches have been strengthened in recent years, but the
weakened executive branch still lingers in the past with no accountability
and no uniformity of purpose.'2"
Other speakers urged that the governor should choose the cabinet;12 the
elected cabinet system is illogical;"z the current system is confusing and
dissipates the responsibility and authority of the governor; 126 and the
governor should be allowed to effectively manage the executive branch. 27
Interesting variations included Congressman McCollum's suggestion that
if the cabinet cannot be changed to an all-appointed system, at least the
cabinet members should be treated as administrative officers over
individual departments and not as executive officers. 2 ' Somewhat
similarly, Professor Joe Little suggested that an elected cabinet officer
stand only as the head of a particular department and function collegially
with the governor only in a quasi-adjudicatory role, as opposed to
comprising a part of the administration of the executive branch.'29 One
speaker specifically cautioned against electing a banking or insurance
commissioner.' 30 Another supported an appointed cabinet, because the
chance of having an African-American serve in this position would be
enhanced. 131
On the other hand, a number of speakers favored retention of the
cabinet system. 132 Many of the supporters represented environmental
interests and saw the cabinet as a helpful resource for the ordinary
123. See Jessie McCrary, representing himself, Presentation at Miami Public Hearing (Aug.

20, 1997).
124. See David A. Newton, representing himself, Presentation at Panama City Public Hearing
(July 22, 1997); Eugene Wine, representing himself, Presentation at Miami Public Hearing (Aug.
20, 1997).
125. See Sherlee Aronson, representing herself, Presentation at Pensacola Public Hearing (July
23, 1997).
126. See John Lepke, representing himself, Presentation at Gainesville Public Hearing (July

30, 1997).
127. See Karen Matteson, representing the Chamber of Commerce, Presentation at Tampa
Public hearing (Sept. 11, 1997).

128. See Congressman Bill McCollum, Presentation atOrlando Public Hearing (Sept. 4,1997).
129. See ProfessorJoe Little, University of Florida College ofLaw, Presentation at Gainesville
Public Hearing (July 30, 1997).

130. See Robert M. Nied, representing himself, Presentation at Jacksonville Public Hearing
(July 29, 1997).
131. See Gerald L. White, Sr., representing himself, Presentation at Tampa Public Hearing
(Sept. 11, 1997).
132. See State Representative Jerry Melvin, Presentation at PensacolaPublic Hearing (July 23,

1997); Marion County Commissioner Randy Harris, Presentation at Gainesville Public Hearing
(July 30,1997); Jack Schifrel, representing himself, Presentation at Fort Lauderdale Public Hearing
(Aug. 21, 1997); Clayton Maxwell, representing the Unincorporated Homeowners Association of

Lee County, Presentation at Fort Myers Public Hearing (Sept. 12, 1997).
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citizen'33 and an opportunity for executive decisions to reflect vision and
breadth that is often lacking in other forums."3 One speaker favored
establishing a cabinet position for environmental issues.'35
Certainly the presentation that most caught the interest of the
Commission on this issue, was one made jointly by Comptroller Bob
Milligan and Treasurer Bill Nelson.136 The two appeared together at the
Tampa public hearing and recommended combining the offices of
comptroller and treasurer into one chief financial officer. They would then
eliminate three of the six cabinet offices, leaving the attorney general as
chief legal officer and the "merged" chief financial officer to sit with the
governor on such matters as education, law enforcement, environmental
policy, state lands, investment
of pension funds, issuance of bonds, power
37
plant siting and clemency.
C. ProposalsFiled
A number of cabinet-related proposals were filed during the course of
the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission. They are, briefly, as
follows:
Proposal69 by Commissioner Riley: The commissioner of
education is to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law.
The education commissioner would exercise the same duties
as under current law and would continue to serve on the
cabinet.
Proposal113 by Commissioner Evans-Jones: In the absence
of the governor and at the governor's request, the lieutenant
governor shall preside over and have a vote on the cabinet.
Proposal 117 by Commissioner Corr: The state board of
education is composed of no more than 7 members appointed
by the governor.
Proposal 159 by Commissioner Mathis: Establishes a 2member cabinet composed of the attorney general and chief
fiscal officer (combining the offices of comptroller and

133. See Ellen Peterson, representing the Sierra Club, Presentation at Fort Myers Public
Hearing (Sept. 12, 1997).
134. See Linda M. Bremer and Patricia Anderson, representing themselves, Presentation at
Jacksonville Public Hearing (July 29, 1997).
135. See Greg Braun, representing the Martin County Audubon Society, Presentation at West
Palm Beach Public Hearing (Aug. 22, 1997).
136. See Bob Milligan and Bill Nelson, Presentation atTampapublic hearing (Sept. 11, 1997).

137. id.
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treasurer).
Proposal163 by Commissioner Evans-Jones: Establishes a4member cabinet composed of the lieutenant governor,
attorney general, chief financial officer and commissioner of
education. Requires the governor to appoint a secretary of
state and commissioner of agriculture.
Proposal165 by Commissioner Corr: Establishes a cabinet
composed of the attorney general, treasurer (combining the
comptroller and treasurer), and other members not to exceed
a total of 7, as determined and appointed by the governor or
as prescribed by law.
Proposal 166 by Commissioner Riley: Establishes a 7member state board of education appointed by the governor,
subject to senate confirmation. The board appoints the
commissioner of education, who continues to serve on the
cabinet.
Proposal 168 by Commissioner Corr: Reiterates the 25department rule of Article IV, § 6. (Later amended to preclude
agencies from being headed by the governor and cabinet and
then subsequently amended to delete that amendment.)
Proposal176 by Commissioner Alfonso: Precludes agencies
from being headed by the governor and cabinet.
Proposal 182 by Commissioner Riley: Establishes an
appointed cabinet and precludes agencies from being headed
by the governor and cabinet.
D. Committee on the Executive
All proposals relating to cabinet reform were referred to the Committee
on the Executive. 138 The Committee first discussed the subject extensively
at its November 12, 1997 meeting. Early on, committee members
recognized that the governor's authority is diminished by the cabinet. If the
issue was to be addressed, it would have to be done in this arena because
the legislature was very unlikely to adjust a structure that operated to its
favor. 39 The Committee also decided to draft its own proposal to substitute
138. This was a7-membercommittee chaired by Commissioner Carlos Alfonso. The members
were Thomas Barkdull, Chris Corr, Marilyn Evans-Jones, Clay Henderson, Frank Morsani, and

James Harold Thompson.
139. "This is part of what keeps them ahead of the game." Commissioner Clay Henderson,
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for the several proposals referred to the Committee."4 The proposal
became identified as Committee Substitute to Proposals 159, 163, and
182.141

In managing the issues, the following factors were laid out to ensure a
process that considered all of the principal issues: (1) size; (2) authority;
(3) ethics; (4) elected versus appointed executive officers; and (5) areas of
responsibility. 42 The Committee expressed its desire that a maximum
amount of flexibility be considered in the drafting of the ultimate
proposal. 43
1. Size
While a small majority of the committee favored a two-member cabinet
as proposed in the Milligan-Nelson recommendation, others proposed a
four-member cabinet, retaining the same size or allowing for a flexible
number to be determined by the governor.'" Those favoring the twomember cabinet felt it would enhance accountability 4 s and give the
governor the authority that most citizens believe the office holds.' 46 The
committee submitted a proposal to the full Commission that would have
established a two-member cabinet of the attorney general and treasurer
Committee on Executive meeting (Nov. 12, 1997) (tape available from the Secretary of the Florida
Senate).
140. See id.
141. Committee Substitute was proposed by the Committee on the Executive on January 13,
1998. See Meeting of the Committee on the Executive (Jan. 13, 1998) (tape available from the
Secretary of the Florida Senate). Pursuant to Rule 3.6, a substitute proposal becomes a proposal
when it is reached on the calendar and the original proposals is tabled unless a motion to consider
the substitute fails. By operation of the rule, Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163 and 182
became a proposal when taken up by the Commission on January 26, 1998.
142. See Meeting of the Committee on the Executive (Nov. 12, 1997) (tape available from the
Secretary of the Florida Senate).
143. Commissioner Frank Morsani reminded the members not to micro-manage and to avoid
having to go back and amend the Constitution time after time. See id. Commissioner James Harold
Thompson suggested to the Committee that issues change in importance over time and that the
legislature should be given the latitude to appropriately respond. See id. Commissioner Thomas
Barkdull stated that "[w]ith the possible spelling out in the constitution of collegial responsibilities
for the state board of administration, public lands and pardons, everything else should be left to be
established by law." Id.
144. Commissioner Marilyn Evans-Jones filed Proposal 163, which would have established
a four-member cabinet comprised of the attorney general, treasurer (merging the current duties of
treasurer and comptroller), commissioner of education, and commissioner of agriculture. See id.
Commissioner Clay Henderson favored the status quo or this Evans-Jones approach. See id.
Commissioner Chris Corr filed Proposal 165, which would have established a flexible cabinet
size, providing for two elected members, and that the governor could appoint up to five other
executive officers. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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(combining the constitutional duties of the comptroller and treasurer).' 47
2. Authority
Whether or not committee members agreed on other issues and whether
or not they expressed concerns about increasing the governor's power,
almost all agreed that cabinet determinations should not be made over the
objection of the governor. 4 As Commissioner Barkdull explained:
[I]t is possible that the governor and the other two members
of the cabinet would be of different political persuasions. The
public is entitled to expect that the person they elect as the
chief executive officer have more.., authority than the other
members of the cabinet. The governor.., should not be able
to be outvoted by officers that did not run to be the chief
executive. 149
Commissioner Henderson addressed the issue of the authority of the
cabinet (as opposed to the authority of the governor) and favored following
a different path by determining how to remove from cabinet jurisdiction
much of their routine or mundane responsibilities, yet retain the system for
important issues. 5 '
The version of the bill that was recommended by the committee
contained the following statement: "Affirmative action by the governor and
of
cabinet, sitting in any of its joint capacities, shall require
151 the approval
cabinet."'
the
of
member
one
the governor and at least
3. Ethics
There appeared to be no disagreement that a cabinet member should not
take campaign contributions from industries regulated by a department
administered by that cabinet member. 152 Or, expressed differently and more
147. See Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163 and 182. Note that this was ultimately
changed to a 3-member cabinet by the Commission, infra note 196.
148. Only CommissionerMarilyn Evans-Jones consistently expressed her opposition to giving
the governor more power even in this regard. See Committee on Executive (Nov. 12, 1997 and Jan.
13, 1999) (tapes available from Secretary of the Florida Senate).
149. Id.
150. See Committee on Executive (Nov. 12, 1997) (tape available from Secretary of the
Florida Senate). For example, Commissioner Henderson noted that unification of the marine
agencies (Revision 5 also proposed by the 1997-1998 CRC) would remove a substantial amount
of unnecessary items from cabinet jurisdiction. See Committee on Executive (Dec. 10, 1997) (tape
available from Secretary of the Florida Senate).
151. Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163, 182. Note, this language was modified
when the proposal was amended on March 17, 1998. See infranote 203 and accompanying text.
152. See Commissioner Chris Corr, Committee on Executive (Nov. 12, 1997) (tape available
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specifically, it was argued that the Treasurer and the Comptroller should
not head regulatory departments."' This view was in harmony with
General Milligan's emphasis that an officer should not be elected to
regulate a particular industry.' 54 Since the committee members viewed this
as an element of the legislative reorganization that -would be required
adopted, such a prohibition was not included in the
should the measure be
55
substitute proposal.1
4. Elected vs. Appointed Executive Officers
A number of committee members stated that they favored electing their
officials, at least as a general principle; however, the prospect of
continuing to elect some executive officers while removing them from
cabinet status was only briefly considered. It was suggested by the
Executive Director of Common Cause that the issue presented could be
broken down into two parts: (1) whether the officers should be appointed
or elected, and (2) whether the officers should sit as a collegial body. 56 She
argued that addressing the latter issue would make a significant change,
whether or not multiple executive officers continued to be elected." 7
5. Areas of Responsibility
Rather than limiting the areas of responsibility that could be placed
with the governor and cabinet, the committee came from the opposite
direction and focused on preserving certain cabinetjurisdictions that could
not be removed from that body. These areas included state bonds, state
lands, certain environmental concerns, and clemency. 5

from Secretary of the Florida Senate).
153. See id. (detailing Commissioner Marilyn Evans-Jones). At the time the Comptroller
headed the Department of Banking and Finance and the Treasurer headed the Department of

Insurance.
154. See Constitution Revision Commission, Presentation atTampaPublic Hearing (Sept. 11,

1997).
155. See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text.
156. See Interview with Sally Spener, Committee on Executive (Jan. 13, 1999) (tape available
from Secretary of Florida Senate). Common Cause of Florida, along with the League of Women
Voters, supported wholesale abolishment of the cabinet, but offered this approach as a possible
compromise that would "bring a higher level of accountability." Id.
157. See id.
158. See Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163 and 182; see also Committee on
Executive (Nov. 12,1997) (tape available from Secretary of the Florida Senate). Later, jurisdiction
over the Florida Department of Law Enforcement was added.
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6. Miscellaneous
The initial draft of the committee substitute continued to use the term
"secretary of state" in some sections that referred to the filing of official
documents, l"9 even though that position would no longer be otherwise
contained in the constitution. The Comnittee requested that the term be
removed as it was recommending abolishment of the constitutional office
60
and determined it should not continue to refer to it in the constitution.'
In combining the offices of comptroller and treasurer, the language
restricting the treasurer from disbursing of state funds except upon order
of the comptroller16 1 was deemed unnecessary. And, such order being
unnecessary, the earlier addition of an allowance that the order be in any
form and that it may require disbursement by electronic means 6 2 was
likewise relegated to surplusage and stricken.
Prior to the changes made by Revision 8, the state board of
administration, which among other things, is responsible for investing the
state retirement funds, was comprised of the governor, comptroller and
treasurer. 63 The agency became a constitutional entity in 194216 and was
retained in 1968, although hidden in the depths of a footnote within the
Article XII schedule. 65 The Committee determined that this executive
board should be explicitly established in the executive branch article. Since
the comptroller and treasurer comprised two of the three members of the
board and these offices were being combined into one, a new third
member, the attorney general, was added. Like the 1968 reference, the
language "saving" the state board for the duration of the life of the motor
vehicle fuel tax was included. 166
Revision 8 assigns the governor and cabinet, sitting collegially as the

159. For example, in article IV, § 3(b) "[i]ncapacity to serve as governor may also be
established by certificate filed with the secretary of state..." and in article IV, § 8 "the governor
may, by executive order filed with the secretary of state, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures
160. See CommissionerBarkdull, Committeeon Executive (Jan. 13,1999) (tape availablefrom
Secretary of the Florida Senate). On final adoption, an amendment was adopted to incorporate this
terminology through the constitution. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Mar. 23, 1998, Revision
4, Amendment 1, at 227.
161. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. IV, § 4(c).
162. This provision was added in 1984 by 1983 House Joint Resolution 435.
163. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. XII § 9(c)(5).
164. See S.J. Res. 324,28th Leg. (Fla. 1941).
165. See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. XII, § 9(c)(5) (referring to the creation of the State Board
of Administration in article IX, section 16 of the Constitution of 1885 and proclaiming the board
as continued for the life of article XII, § 9(c)); FLA. CONST. of 1885, article IX, § 16 (appearing as
a footnote to FLA. CONST. of 1968, article XII, § 9).
166. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(e), Revision 8; see also FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. XII, §
9(c)(5).
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trustees of the internal improvement trust fund and the land acquisition
trust fund. The governor and full cabinet, sitting collegially, are assigned
as the trustees of the internal improvement trust fund and the land
acquisition trust fund.1 67 These two boards have historically been headed
by the governor and cabinet in accordance with general law.' 68
A schedule was added by the committee for a number of reasons. First,
implementation of such a substantial change would require time for the
legislature to enact the many necessary changes to general law. Further, all
of the cabinet offices were subject to election in the same 1998 election at
which Revision 8 was adopted. The Committee felt it illogical and unfair
for candidates and the public to undergo the rigors and expense of
campaigns for offices that might not exist. Finally, because of the specter
of term limits, 16 9 the Committee wished to address the fact that it had
changed the nature of some offices to such a degree that an "incumbent"
should not be considered to be running for the same office. The Committee
believed that the offices of both the treasurer and the attorney general
should be considered newly-created offices. 70
E. Commission Action
1. Proposal 168
One of the earliest cabinet-related proposals to reach the stage of
Commission deliberation was Proposal 168, which, as filed and passed by
the Executive Committee, merely restated and reaffirmed the limit on the
number of executive agencies to twenty-five. During deliberations,
however, Commissioner Clay Henderson successfully proposed an
amendment that struck the language found in Section 6 of Article IV,
allowing the Legislature to place administration of an agency under the
supervision of the governor and cabinet. In support, Commissioner
Henderson quoted the report of the Citizens Commission on Cabinet
Reform:
Departments reporting to the Governor and Cabinet are
problematic for several reasons: they consume the Governor's
and Cabinet's time on administrative details, they lack a

167. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(f), rev. 8.
168. See FLA. STAT. § 253.02(1) (1997).
169. In 1992, by way of an initiative petition, Florida electors added 8-year term limits for a
number of state offices, including cabinet offices. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)(4).

170. The full Commission later deleted the attorney general as a newly-created office and
Revision 8 as finally adopted limits this consideration only to the chief financial officer. See FLA.
CONST. art. XII, § 24, Revision 8.
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single, identifiable advocate for their function, they are not
directly accountable to a single individual. The department
should be headed by a Secretary who serves at the pleasure of
the Governor and subject to Senate confirmation.1
This proposal was extraordinarily popular and was unanimously passed on
its first consideration by the Commission on a 25-0 vote.172 In the period
between the first and second airing of Proposal 168,173 the principal cabinet
restructure proposal had been taken up and passed. When heard the second
time, Proposal 168 became a bit of a magnet for cabinet amendments.
Commissioner Thomas Barkdull proposed an amendment which had the
effect of striking the earlier Henderson amendment so that Proposal 168
"would permit collegial responsibility both in the constitution and by
statute."174 Commissioner Alfonso added a section establishing a State
Board of Agriculture, modeled after the similar proposal for an appointed
State Board of Education. 175 As amended, the proposal was favorably
considered on an 18-5 vote.176 On its next hearing, Commissioner Barkdull
proposed an amendment to create the office of custodian of state records
as a statutory office. This was done because the cabinet restructure
proposal had eliminated the secretary of state from the constitution, yet
referred to a custodian of state records as the entity with which many
records would be filed.'" The proposal was considered and passed on a 280 vote. 178 Again, the next day, after adoption of an amendment proposed
by the Style and Drafting Committee, the proposal was passed on17a9 vote of
22-6, giving it the requisite three-fifths vote of the commission.
On the last day of consideration of proposals before submission to the
Style and Drafting Committee for technical review and preparation of
ballot language, the proposal was taken up for the purpose of amendment,
since the cabinet restructure proposal had just been amended to reestablish
the commissioner of agriculture as a cabinet member, and Proposal 168
still contained a section providing for a state board of agriculture.180 It was
the last proposal to be considered at the end of a long and grueling day.

171. Transcript of the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission Proceedings, Jan. 15,
1998, at 69.
172. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Feb. 10, 1998, at 148.
173. Its first hearing was January 15, 1998; its second hearing was February 10, 1998.
174. Transcript of the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission Proceedings, Feb. 10,
1998,,at 145.
175. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Feb. 10, 1998, at 169.
176. See id. at 170.
177. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Feb. 23, 1998, at 182.
178. See id.
179. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Feb. 24, 1998, at 191.
180. See id. at 222.
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The commission had imposed pressure on itself to limit the number of its
' Once
recommendations so as not to overwhelm the ballot and the voters. 81
amended to delete the reference to a state board of agriculture, questions
arose whether this proposal was necessary.8 2 Commissioner Lowndes
noted that the proposal had provided for the establishment of a statutory
office of custodian of state records.8 3 It was considered and agreed that
this office could be established by general law.184 The proposal was then
defeated by an 18-6 vote. 8 5
2. Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163 and 182
As it came from the Executive Committee, Committee Substitute for
Proposals 159, 163 and 182 reduced the number of cabinet members to
two-the attorney general and the treasurer (a combination of the duties
currently assigned to the comptroller and to the treasurer). The cabinet
restructure proposal did not address the state board of education or the
education commissioner other than to strike the education commissioner
as a cabinet member. According to the proposal at thatjuncture, the cabinet
would continue to serve as the state board of education, but the
commissioner of education would no longer serve as a cabinet member.186
Until this point in the commission's deliberations, the issue of
restructure of the public education system had traveled a separate path
from cabinet restructure. It become obvious that somewhere along the line,
if the two proposals were to move forward, they would need to be
harmonized. On January 26, 1998, when the cabinet restructure proposal
was first debated, Commissioner Alfonso successfully amended it to
include an appointed state board of education. 7 In support, Commissioner
Marshall stated that "if we are serious about strengthening the
governorship, there's no better place to start than with education. It is the
biggest piece, and as far as I'm concerned, the most important piece of

181. See, e.g.,Transcriptofthe 1997-1998 ConstitutionRevision Commission, Mar. 17,1998,
at 9-14. Here, Rules Committee Chair Thomas Barkdull, speaking on apoint of personal privilege,
reminded the commissioners that each of the appointing authorities advised to concentrate on a
limited number of revisions and that "[t]he success of our work and the acceptance by the people
will be in inverse proportion to the length of the ballot." Id.

182. See Transcript of the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission, Mar. 17, 1998, at
358-364.
183. An amendment that would have required by law the establishment of an office of
custodian of state records had earlier been adopted. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, at 182.
184. See Transcripts of the 1997-1998 Const. Revision Comm'n, Mar. 17, 1998, at 361.
185. Pursuantto Rule5.4 ofthe 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission Rules, 22 votes
were necessary for ballot placement.
186. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 3, Jan. 26, 1998, at 152.
187. See id. at 152.
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state government.' ' 88
Commissioner HT Smith agreed, stating:
We need to do something radical.... We need to tell the
people of Florida that we are going to change this, we are
going to go from worst to first. And we are going to do it by
putting professionals in charge, we are going to do it by
holding the governor responsible. 189
Commissioner Henderson proposed an amendment, which was not
adopted, that would have established an appointed state board of education,
with an elected commissioner of education.' 90
Commissioner Martha Barnett inquired how this proposal and Proposal
168 would work together and, after significant colloquy, clarified that
when read together, the proposals would limit the governor and cabinet
sitting collegially to only those boards expressly set out in the constitution
and that the legislature could not add other collegial duties.' 9 '
Commissioners Butterworth and Thompson added a section ensuring
that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement would be administered
by the governor and cabinet. 92 Commissioner Thompson successfully
amended the term "treasurer" to "chief financial officer."'' 93
Committee Substitute for Proposals 159, 163 and 182 was taken up
again on February 24,1998. Commissioner Henderson spoke against the
proposal, giving three principal reasons for his opposition. First, he
objected to taking away the ability to elect the education commissioner,
particularly as the state spends more on education than any other budget
item. Second, the agricultural community had expressed its firm opposition
to losing the ability to elect the agriculture commissioner. Third,
Commissioner Henderson explained that there is something "special"
about the cabinet and that is that it works. "It works to settle disputes on
a statewide basis, it helps to elevate issues to a statewide level.... [J]t is
an institution that has served this state well."' 94
Chair of the Executive Committee, Carlos Alfonso, supported the
proposal, arguing that every living governor, liberal, moderate or

188.
189.
190.
191.
adopted.
192.
193.
194.

Transcript of the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission, Jan. 26, 1998, at 115.
Id. at 122.
See CRC JOuRNAL, supra note 3, Jan. 26, 1998, at 152.
See Transcript, supra note 188, at 102-04. Note that Proposal 168 later failed to be
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See Transcript, supra note 188, at 152.
Id.
Transcript of the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission, Feb. 24, 1998, at 238-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/7

28

Kearney: The Florida Cabinet in the Age of Aquarias
20001

FLORIDA CABINET

conservative is a proponent of the measure."9 He stated further that while
the state had modernized the legislative and judicial branches, our
executive system dates back 100 years-to a system that requires the
governor to work with six, sometimes opposing, members. 6 The proposal
"is a compromise between wholesale abolishment... and keeping the
system that we have" and it streamlines the system. 1" Commissioner
Alfonso argued that the proposal strengthens the importance of education
by insulating it from the whims of politics, by better ensuring a
professional to head the education department, and by allowing for the full
energies of the education commissioner to be devoted to education.198
Finally, Alfonso urged that this is a proposal "to let the leader of the state
that the people pick lead the state.""' The proposal passed on a 24-7
vote.m
On its final hearing before being packaged by the Style and Drafting
Committee, the proposal was amended to reinsert the commissioner of
agriculture as a cabinet member." 1 While unstated in the floor debate, the
agriculture community lobbied hard to retain a cabinet-level agriculture
commissioner.20 Because a three-member cabinet sitting with the governor
establishes an even-numbered board, it was necessary to amend the
language that had required the approval of the governor and one cabinet
member on any issue. Therefore, a provision was added requiring that in
the event of a tie vote, the prevailing side would be that side on which the
governor voted. 2 3 This adds strength to the governor's position and came
close to incorporating the views of the Committee on the Executive that
cabinet determinations should not be made over the objection of the
governor.2
High among the considerations applied to virtually every proposal was
whether a matter could be determined by the legislature and, if so, if it

195. See id. at 239. Commissioner Alfonso noted that although Governor Martinez had not
addressed the Commission, the two had talked, whereupon Governor Martinez assured
Commissioner Alfonso that his sentiments were in accord. See id.
196. See id. at 240.

197. Id.
198. See id. at 240-41.

199. Id. at 242.
200. See FLA. CONST., supra note 179, at 220.
201. See id.
202. "Commission members originally wanted to do away with the elected post of agriculture

commissioner, but decided to keep it after intense lobbying by agricultural interests." Julie
Hauserman, Revision Would Eliminate Three CabinetPositions,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23,
1998, at 413.
203. CS/Proposal Nos. 159, 163, and 182, § 2 (available from the Secretary of the Florida
Senate and from the Florida Archives).
204. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

could be left to the discretion of that body. 5 The cabinet restructure
revision, therefore, was drafted with a goal of instituting the changes
required to be made to the constitution for a more accountable executive
branch and leaving enough flexibility for the Legislature to respond to the
needs of the state over the passage of time. The Commission included in
the revision the requirement of collegial decision-making in the areas of
state lands, state bonds, and the state police agency.2" The failure of the
Commission to otherwise restrict collegial decision-making did not derive
from its support of the concept, but rather from a combination of
understanding the rule of unforeseen consequences 0 7 and from its respect
for the role of the Legislature.
F. The Election
The voters adopted Revision 8 by a margin of 1,943,800 to
1,556,273.08 Probably no one was more surprised nor felt more vindicated
than the members of the Constitution Revision Commission. There are a
number of reasons for the success of this and the other proposals. 209 As to
cabinet restructure, the 1992 term limit restriction would operate to limit
any sitting cabinet members from seeking reelection for their seats in the
2002 elections. For the first time, cabinet members would not have the
incentive to strongly campaign against cabinet restructure.
The voters of Florida in 1998 were a new group, a large number of
whom come from other states-states where their governors had the
authority to go with the office and who were not hesitant about this type of
exercise of gubernatorial power. Also significant is the fact that, from start
205. Professor Robert F. Williams, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers University
advised at the opening session: "You might want to consider some sort of a 'constitutionalization
impact statement,' to try to force yourselves to think beyond the pros and cons of the policy that
you're discussing, but also to think if it's a good idea, do you need it in the Constitution?" CRC
JOURNAL, supra note 3, June 17, 1997, at 18.
206. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4, Revision 8.
207. Professor Williams stated:
Studies have shown that the good things are usually anticipated. The good that

you get from putting something in the State Constitution, you usually can predict.
But bad things are usually unanticipated. There are things you couldn't imagine
or you couldn't predict, hard as you thought about it. So the unanticipated

negative consequences of putting something in a State Constitution really ought
to be remembered.
See FLA. CoNsT. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 205, at 18.

208. Or, adopted by a margin of 55.5% to 44.5%. See Tabulation of Official Results, Fla. Gen.
Election (Nov. 3, 1998) (on file at the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections).
209. Of the nine proposals recommended by the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission,
eight were adopted. Only Revision 10, relating to local government issues failed to be adopted. Id.
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to end, the Commission carried with it the experiences of the 1978
Commission and worked hard to avoid the pitfalls that befell the revisions
proposed in 1978.
The rules of procedure required an extraordinary majority of three-fifths
of the Commission (at least 22 of 37 votes) in order to place a proposal on
the ballot. 2 0 At virtually every commission meeting, reminders were made
to limit the number of proposals and to refrain from intruding into matters
properly within the auspices of the legislature. The Commission was not
successful in entirely avoiding "logrolling;" that is, coupling independent
concepts into one revision, but it did refrain from coupling proposals that
did not have a common theme as had been done in 1978.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, unlike the 1978 Commission,
the recent Commission was funded in the budget year following its
submission of recommendations
for the purpose of educating the public
211
about the proposals.
IV. CONCLUSION

As earlier expressed, Revision 8 addresses only one of the two principal
criticisms of Florida's cabinet system. It does reduce the number of
executive officers that comprise the executive department. However, the
Revision does not resolve the issue of the number of executive departments
headed collegially by the governor and cabinet and the excessive number
of functions assigned to the governor and cabinet.
The Florida Legislature is obviously burdened with the task of
reorganizing the executive branch to accommodate the changes in
structure. 12 It is hoped that the Legislature does not stop at this point, but
will heed the recommendations of the Citizens Commission on Cabinet
Reform that "[t]he time of the... highest
elected officials of Florida
' 213
policy.
of
matters
for
reserved
be
should
Among the recommendations of the Citizens Commission on Cabinet
Reform was that agencies assigned to be administered jointly by the
governor and cabinet instead should be assigned to a secretary appointed

210. See Rule 5.4, Subsection 4, Constitution Revision Commission Rules (1997).
211. Florida's fiscal year begins on July 1.The proposals were submitted on May 5, 1998. The
Commission was able to fund travel expenses for commissioners to speak at forums throughout the
state up until the time of the November election and to purchase public service announcements
explaining the proposals. 1998 House Bill 4201, General Appropriations Act, Line Item 1575, at
360.
212. At the least, providing for how the Departments of Banking and Finance, Insurance, and
State will be administered, and making necessary changes regarding the appointment of a

commissioner of education.
213. The Citizens Commission on Cabinet Reform, Final Report, Executive Summary (1995).
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by the governor. 4 It was also recommended that the funding decisions
made by the governor and cabinet sitting as the administration commission
should be placed under the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting,
and that the rules adopted by the administration commission (the Uniform
Rules of Administrative Procedure) be placed in the jurisdiction of the
department of management services.2 5 A number of appointments
currently made by the cabinet should, according to the Commissioner, be
made by the governor, including the Director of the Division of
Administrative Hearings, parole commissioners, and members of the
Florida Elections Commission." 6 All of the Citizens Commission's
recommendations
can be accomplished by amendment to the general
217
law.
The Constitution Revision Commission steadfastly avoided imposing
unnecessary structure in the constitution that was within the purview of the
legislature. Had significant changes as recommended by the Citizens
Commission on Cabinet Reform been implemented, it would have been
less likely that the cabinet restructure revision would have gained
momentum. Until some of those changes are effectuated, the debate will
conttinue.

214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. "The charge of the Commission was to conduct a review of all statutory responsibilities
and functions performed by the Governor and the Cabinet sitting as a collegial body." Id.at 1.
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